RE: DECISION DATED
17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361 ENTITLED “PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO”, FORMER ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO,
RESPONDENT. EN BANC, A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015.
“x x x.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of
respondent’s conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be
answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude.
To
consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the
same must have been “done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. [It must involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”1
In Catalan,
Jr. v. Silvosa,2 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same
question posed in this case, viz:
Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27, Rule 138
provides:
‘Section
27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority [to do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.’
xxxx
[T]he
crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,3 we ruled:
‘By
applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the
crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a
public officer;
2. the offender
accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. such offer or
promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the
offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral
turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or
refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes
a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he
owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, fee fact that the offender
takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed
on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of
right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.4 (Emphases and italics in the original)
Clearly,
direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a
ground for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an
attorney.
The
Court is mindful that a lawyer’s conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude does not automatically call for the imposition of the supreme penalty
of disbarment since it may, in its discretion, choose to impose the less severe
penalty of suspension. As held, “the determination of whether an attorney
should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.”5 Here, however, the circumstances surrounding the case
constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the
OBC.
It must
be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime, respondent was an
Assistant Public Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of
extorting money from a party to a case handled by him does not only violate the
requirement that cases must be decided based on the merits of the parties’
respective evidence but also lessens the people’s confidence in the rule of
law.
Indeed respondent’s
conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required
of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public
office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and
is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice.6
Hence,
for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as a
government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect
his qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office as
an attorney.
As a
final note, it is well to state that:
The
purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be
competent, honorable and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the public at
large] may repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and
vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not
hesitate to rid [the] profession of odious members.7
X x x.”
1
Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in
G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24,2012,670
SCRA 366, 371.
2
A.C. No. 7360, July 24,2012, 677 SCRA
352.
3
439 Phil. 339, 346-347 (2002).
4
Id at 361-362.
5
Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez, A.C, No. 9116, March 12, 2014.
6
Ramos v. Atty. Imbang, 557 Phil. 507, 516 (2007).
7
Ramos v. Atty. Imbang, 557 Phil. 507, 516 (2007).
