Sunday, March 8, 2015

The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/126210.html


"x x x.
Succinctly put, the issues in the instant case are: first, whether or not Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter; second, whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor; and third, whether or not the dismissal of the charges against the petitioner is warranted by the evidence at hand.

First. Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

In moving for the dismissal of the case against the petitioner, the prosecutor averred:

"1. That on October 18, 1994 (sic) he was in receipt of a resolution dated September 23, 1994 from the Secretary of Justice, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

‘x x xE-xsm
WHEREFORE. Your resolution is partly reversed. You are directed to cause the dismissal of the information if any, filed against respondent Cristina Perez in the above-entitled case and report on the action taken therein within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.’

"2. That pursuant to the said resolution, an amended information is (sic) hereto attached excluding Cristina Perez is well in order and copy of said amended information is hereto attached.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case insofar as respondent Cristina Perez be dismissed and the amended information be admitted."[16]

The Order granting the above quoted motion states in its entirety that:

"O R D E RKy-le

"Finding no legal impediment to the same, the motion filed by Public Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang seeking the amendment of the Information is hereby GRANTED, and the Amended Information attached thereto is hereby ADMITTED to form part of the record of the above-entitled case.
"By the foregoing token, the warrant of arrest already issued is hereby recalled and rendered ineffective with respect only to accused CRISTINA PEREZ.

"SO ORDERED."[17]

The above quoted Order allowing the amendment of the information to exclude petitioner therefrom effectively dismissed the criminal case against the latter. That the trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case is apparent from the foregoing order. Judge Masadao’s reliance on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court’s pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[18] as reiterated in the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[19] to wit: Ky-calr

"In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judge’s own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency.

"As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul."[20]Calr-ky

Petitioner contends that the doctrine laid down by this Court in Martinez v. Court of Appeals[21] is not applicable to the instant case for several reasons. First, in the Martinez case, the private offended party was deprived of due process as he was not furnished with a copy of the prosecution’s motion to dismiss, whereas in this case, not only was the private respondent furnished a copy of the motion to dismiss, it was also given an opportunity to file its comment thereon. Second, in the case at bar, the Solicitor General adopts the view that the trial judge acted correctly in granting the motion to dismiss while in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Solicitor General recommended the setting aside of the order granting the motion to dismiss. Finally, the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused in Martinez v. Court of Appeals[23] was based solely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice. On the other hand, at the time Judge Masadao granted the motion to dismiss the criminal case against the petitioner, he already had before him the affidavit-complaint of private respondent, the resolution of the prosecutor finding probable cause against the employees of the money shop, the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the case against the petitioner, the private respondent’s comment and supplemental comment to the latter, and the position papers of the petitioner and the private respondent.[24]

Petitioner’s arguments are not convincing. Me-sm

A perusal of the Martinez case reveals that the opinion of this Court finding the dismissal of the case against the accused erroneous was not predicated on the violation of the private offended party’s right to due process nor on the recommendation of the Solicitor General. In fact, we categorically stated therein that the "fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously."[25] The first part refers to the fact that the private offended party was not afforded his day in court while the latter pertains to the failure of the judge to make an independent assessment of the evidence or lack thereof against the accused. Otherwise stated, the first is not the rationale behind the latter declaration. S-l-x
Furthermore, petitioner’s asseveration that as the records of the case were already before Judge Masadao, it can be safely assumed that he had studied them and thereafter agreed with the prosecution that the evidence did not support the earlier finding of probable cause against the petitioner. This is non sequitur and is simply belied by the order that nonchalantly granted the motion to dismiss. Moreover, Judge Masadao categorically declined to pass upon the merits of the private respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner, and chose to summarily deny the same on the ground of the private respondent’s lack of personality to revive the criminal charges against the petitioner.[26]

Second. The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Sc-sl
x
In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that:

"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant."[28]

Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,[29] the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. Sl-xsc

Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals[30] allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. We held therein that although the correct procedure would have been to appeal the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the President, the said remedy was unavailable to the private offended party as the penalty involved was neither reclusion perpetua nor death.[31] Hence, as no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to the private offended party, filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper.[32]Sl-xm-is

It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.[33]

In support of her position, petitioner invokes our ruling in Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court[34] which, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, is not applicable to the case at bar. We quote with approval the Court of Appeals’ incisive opinion on this matter:

"For one, Caes is a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms and marijuana, conviction for which would not entail any civil liability on the part of the accused. Here, the very nature of the offense charged, to wit: estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, immediately connotes damages for which the accused may be held civilly liable in case of conviction. x x x. M-issdaa
"For another there is no immediate and direct offended party in Caes. It was a simple case of violation of special laws where no particular person or individual stands as a victim of the offense charged. Such is not the situation in the case at bench. For here, the anomalous abstraction of funds in the petitioner’s money shop directly and immediately inflicts financial damage to the petitioner.

"Then, too, in Caes, at stake is the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There, accused Joel B. Caes was a detention prisoner but the trial could not proceed because the prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to appear, resulting in numerous postponements and resettings which lasted for more than one year. After the case was provisionally dismissed on motion of the prosecution, a prosecution witness whose non-appearance in court was the very cause for the dismissal, filed a motion to revive, which was granted by the trial judge. In vitiating the order of the revival, the Supreme Court did rule, among other things, that said witness has no personality to file the motion as only the prosecuting fiscal could. At the same time, however, the High Court stressed the right of the accused to a speedy trial and ruled as permanent the prior dismissal of the case even as the lower court termed is as merely "provisional". x x x. Sd-aad-sc

"x x x  x x x    x x x.

"Finally, it must be emphasized herein that unlike in Caes where the prosecution witness who filed the motion to revive could have easily asked the public prosecutor himself to file said motion, here, such an alternative is simply unthinkable for the simple reason that the public prosecutor, albeit originally for the inclusion of the herein private respondent in the information, was the very one who filed the amended information upon the direction of his superior, the Secretary of Justice. In short, while there does not exist a conflict of position between the prosecution witness and the public prosecutor in Caes, the present case presents the sad spectacle of an offended party very much anxious to prosecute an accused but the public prosecutor who must have shared the same interest, had to move for the exclusion of said accused because he was ordered by his boss."[35]

Third. This Court cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the petitioner. Rtc-spped

As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.[36] There are, however, exceptions[37] to this rule, none of which are obtaining in the case now before us. 

x x xScl-a
x x x.

x x xx x x."