“Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate
delay in resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the
respondents, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 ma inly
to uphold their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the
case against the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to
the Office of the Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 87 in
which the Court held that speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with
reasonable delays, the State supported its contention by listing the various
incidents that had caused the delay in the investigation, and then laying part
of the blame on the respondents themselves.
The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article
III of the Constitution, which declares:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in
all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.88 While the concept of speedy disposition
is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient,89 the right to the speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.90
According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,91 inordinate delay in resolving
a criminal complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal
of the criminal case.92
Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive?
We answer in the affirmative.
The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated
had supposedly occurred in the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23,
2001. Yet, the criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25,
2002 when Ombudsman Marcelo equested PAGC to provide his office with the
documents relevant to the expose of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on December
23, 2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the
Ombudsman. It was only on November 6, 2006, however, when the Special Panel
created to investigate Cong. Jimenez's criminal complaint issued the Joint
Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be filed against the respondents.
Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only on January 5, 2007.93 The
Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents'
motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008.
Ultimately, the informations charging the respondents with four
different crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez were all filed on
April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the commencement of Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding investigation
and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five
years and five months.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken
an unusually long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and
to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan.
Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the
peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents'
right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. If, in Tatad
v. Sandiganbayan,94 the Court ruled that a delay of almost three
years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation
of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy
disposition of his case, taking into account the following, namely: (a) the
complaint had been resurrected only after the accused had a falling out with
former President Marcos, indicating that political motivations had played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; ( b) the
Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by
law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and ( c) the simple
factual and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a greater
reason for us to hold so in the respondents' case.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was
reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State
miserably failed.
For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately
filed in court primarily because of the insufficiency of the evidence to
establish probable cause, like not having a document showing that the funds
(worth US$1,999,965.00 as averred in the complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had
reached Secretary Perez;95 and that it could not obtain the document, and to
enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed to await the
ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR Agreement),96
and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT).97
To us, however, the State's dependence on the ratification of the two treaties
was not a sufficient justification for the delay. The fact-finding investigation
had extended from January 15, 2003, when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the
recommendation of the Special Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. Jimenez
for fact-finding investigation, until November 14, 2005, when the FIO completed
its fact-finding investigation. That period accounted for a total of two years
and 10 months. In addition, the FIO submitted its report only on November 14,
2005, which was after the Department of Justice had received on September 8,
2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh, the Deputy Government Counsel of the Hongkong
Special Administrative Region in response to the request for assistance dated
June 23, 2005,98 and the reply of the Office of Justice of Switzerland dated February
10, 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005 from Liza Favre, the
Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang, Acting Assistant
Ombudsman, FIO, together with documents pertaining to the bank accounts
relevant to the investigation.99 For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time
until the HKSAR Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate
before it would proceed with the preliminary investigation was oppressive,
capricious and vexatious, because the respondents were thereby subjected to a
long and unfair delay.
We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State
would thereby deliberately gain an advantage over the respondents during the
preliminary investigation. At no time should the progress and success of the
preliminary investigation of a criminal case be made dependent upon the
ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would provide to the prosecutorial
arm of the State, already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its resources,
an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation. To allow the
delay under those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process
of law - fair play, because the field of contest between the accuser and the
accused should at all times be level; and due process of law, because no less
that our Constitution guarantees the speedy disposition of the case.
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not
be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the former was only
preparatory in relation to the latter; 100 and that the period spent in the former
should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted to the
preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial,
quasijudicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered
inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted.
Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for
purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of
their cases had been violated.
There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the
long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges against the respondents
before the proper court. On the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation
to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the preliminary investigation
would not require more than five years to ascertain the relevant factual and
legal matters. The basic elements of the offense, that is, the intimidation or
pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the manner by which the money
extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had been identified as the
perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish probable
cause to charge them with the offense. We thus agree with the following
observation of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
With the Ombudsman's finding that the extortion (intimidation) was
perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US
$1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of
the accused, there is no reason why within a reasonable period from these
dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was there,
the asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the information
filed only on April 18, 2008.
For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more to consider
and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to
give due course to the complaint or dismiss it are on hand. The case is more
than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression
of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to
act within reasonable time. 101
In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents' right
to due process as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES
the petitions for certiorari for their lack of merit. X x x.”
See -
People vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al., GR 189063, Dec. 11.
2013.
