Sunday, December 15, 2013

Article 2060 of the Civil Code clearly requires that in order for the guarantor to make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within the Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.



"x x x.

Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.  The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter.  However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor.  This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.[37]

Article 2060 of the Civil Code reads: 

            Art. 2060.  In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.[38]

The afore-quoted provision imposes a condition for the invocation of the defense of excussion.  Article 2060 of the Civil Code clearly requires that in order for the guarantor to make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within the Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.[39]

          It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still failed to point out to the respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code.  Such failure on petitioner’s part forecloses his right to set up the defense of excussion.
         
          Worthy of note as well is the Sheriff’s return stating that the only property of Macrogen Realty which he found was its deposit ofP20,242.23 with the Planters Bank.

          Article 2059(5) of the Civil Code thus finds application and precludes petitioner from interposing the defense of excussion.  We quote:

            Art. 2059.  This excussion shall not take place:
               
                x x x x

            (5)  If it may be presumed that an execution on the property of the principal debtor would not result in the satisfaction of the obligation.


               As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

            We find untenable the claim that the [herein petitioner] Benjamin Bitanga cannot be compelled to pay Pyramid because the Macrogen Realty has allegedly sufficient assets.  Reason:  The said [petitioner] had not genuinely controverted the return made by Sheriff Joseph F. Bisnar, who affirmed that, after exerting diligent efforts, he was not able to locate any property belonging to the Macrogen Realty, except for a bank deposit with the Planter’s Bank at Buendia, in the amount of P20,242.23.  It is axiomatic that the liability of the guarantor arises when the insolvency or inability of the debtor to pay the amount of debt is proven by the return of the writ of execution that had not been unsatisfied.[40]


IN ALL, we fail to point out any impropriety in the rendition of a summary judgment in favor of the respondent. 
x x x."


Read - 

BENJAMIN BITANGA,
                         Petitioner,




-  versus  -




PYRAMID CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CORPORATION,
                       Respondent.

G.R. No. 173526

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
       Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.


Promulgated:

August 28, 2008
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