Monday, June 17, 2013

Legal ethics – an oxymoron?

see - Legal ethics – an oxymoron?


A law dean (Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, J.D.), who is not a trial lawyer, just to praise his father (retired Court of Appeals Assoc. Justice Hilarion Aquino) in his column, had to go to the extent of denigrating the entire legal profession of the Philippines to be noticed and be read. I find it in bad taste.



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That is exactly how one blogger put it: Legal ethics is an oxymoron.  It was not so much a swipe at the law as at lawyers, and the fact is that in the Philippines, as well as in other jurisdictions as well, they suffer a trust-deficit.  People it seems trust embalmers more than they trust lawyers.  This is no laughing matter, at least not for those who care passionately about serving the ends of justice.
It was with this concern that my father, Justice Hilarion Aquino, commenced his lecture as the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer (2013), a recognition given him by the Founding Chancellor Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera Foundation and the Philippine Judicial Academy.  Last year, the distinction went to Justice Adolf Azcuna, now chancellor of the Academy, who delivered a lecture on the Writ of Amparo (the rule that, in many ways, he authored) and how it has thus far figured in the Philippine legal system.  My dad’s paper and lecture were titled “Legal and Judicial Ethics Revisited: Problems and Prospects.”  Justice Ameurfina Herrera was not only the first chancellor of the Academy, she also so set her seal on it for all time, her brand of leadership and her passion for excellence.  Wishing their mother’s legacy perpetuated, her children set up the Foundation that aimed at assisting the Judicial Academy in promoting the authorship and delivery of learned papers on the subjects with which the Academy is concerned.
Dad’s first thesis was that even if there is a growing trend to consider the ethics of the legal profession as the conventions developed by lawyers in the practice of law, one had to recognize that, inscribed in legal and judicial ethics, is morality.  The concept of justice is, after all, a moral concept.  For the lawyer this demanded the constant advocacy not only of a client’s cause, but of justice.  It meant, in the concrete, that it would be unethical for the lawyer to espouse a position or advance the adoption of a submission that violated the demands of justice.  Citing the code of professional conduct of the Spanish College of Lawyers, he addressed the dilemma of having to choose between a client’s interests and the demands of justice — and he maintained the position that it was never justified to betray the cause of justice because of loyalty to one’s client.  Judicially, this also demanded of the judge the creative interpretation of the law that, without setting the letter of the law aside, nevertheless allowed the court to do justice.  As for the well-worn Roman aphorism “Dura lex sed lex”, dad had this to say: “One cannot quiet the remorse of conscience by citing a Latin maxim.”  He recalled the revered Justice JBL Reyes’ mantra: “No master but the law, no guide but conscience, no goal but justice.”
He then went on to deal with the ethics of prosecutorial discretion, urging prosecutors to adopt American standards: a prosecutor has no business filing the Information against an accused in court when he does not have on hand the evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction.  True, indeed, that all that is required by the rules so that the Information may be filed is ‘probable cause’ but as prosecutors’ guides in the United States almost unanimously maintain:  It is immoral for a prosecutor to file the Information unless he is convinced of the guilt of the accused and has the evidence to establish it.  If all he has is probable cause, then does he hope thereby to fish for evidence sufficient to convict while the trial is in progress and the accused is already subject to the ordeal of a trial?  In this respect, dad found the Rule on the Judicial Affidavit apropos: the judicial affidavits — that constitute the testimony on direct examination — of all the witnesses that the prosecution can muster in its arsenal of evidence must be submitted at the commencement of the proceedings or forever be excluded.
Boldly he advocated the adoption of “general welfare” as a basis for a judgment.  It was not enough, he maintained, for a judgment to rest on facts and law.  It had to consider general welfare as well.  A decision that may be legally correct but disastrous when reckoned against the economic interests of the public and the State would still be a disaster of a decision, no matter its punctilious observance of the letter of the law.  Once more the Civil Code of Spain provided a lead: the law is to be interpreted also in the light of social contexts!
It was these positions that Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, who was in attendance, acknowledged as daring, bold, far-reaching and intrepid.  She personally expressed to dad her concurrence with his positions.
Quite interestingly, as dad delivered his lecture at the Global Learning Center of the Philippine Judicial Academy at Tagaytay, he was seen, heard, and his powerpoint presentation received simultaneously at the Session Hall of the Supreme Court at Padre Faura.  Mommy, my brother, my sister, my nephews and I were in attendance as well — and we could only thank God for having kept daddy healthy in body (recent health issues notwithstanding) and keen in thought. It was as gratifying for us to see how many continue to revere and respect him as a mentor or a colleague, and to cherish and love him as a friend!

rannie_aquino@sanbeda.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@csu.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@yahoo.com

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