Petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages
In Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete,[45]
the Court expounded on the requisite elements for a litigant’s entitlement to
moral damages, thus:
Moral damages are awarded if the following
elements exist in the case: (1) an injury clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or
omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In addition, the person claiming moral damages
must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the
law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the result of the
actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown to have
been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive. Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In alleging that WWWEC acted in bad
faith, Aliling has the burden of proof to present evidence in support of his
claim, as ruled in Culili v. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.:[46]
According to jurisprudence, “basic is the
principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty
to prove the same.” By imputing bad faith to the actuations of ETPI, Culili has
the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation
of unfair labor practice. Culili failed to discharge this burden and his bare
allegations deserve no credit.
This was reiterated in United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN)
v. National Electrification Administration (NEA),[47]
in this wise:
It must be noted that the burden of proving
bad faith rests on the one alleging it. As the Court ruled in Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications, Inc.,
“According to jurisprudence, ‘basic is the principle that good faith is
presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.’”
Moreover, in Spouses Palada v. Solidbank
Corporation, the Court stated, “Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
Similarly, Aliling has failed to
overcome such burden to prove bad faith on the part of WWWEC. Aliling has not
presented any clear and convincing evidence to show bad faith. The fact that he
was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that “[t]here was no sufficient showing of bad faith or abuse
of management prerogatives in the personal action taken against petitioner.”[48]
In Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry
Corporation v. Binamira,[49]
the Court ruled:
A dismissal may be contrary to law but by
itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed employee
to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified
solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without
authorized cause and due process.
The officers of WWWEC cannot be held
jointly and severally liable with the
company
The CA held the president of WWWEC,
Jose B. Feliciano, San Mateo
and Lariosa jointly and severally liable for the monetary awards of Aliling on
the ground that the officers are considered “employers” acting in the interest
of the corporation. The CA cited NYK
International Knitwear Corporation Philippines (NYK)
v. National Labor Relations Commission[50]
in support of its argument. Notably, NYK
in turn cited A.C. Ransom Labor
Union-CCLU v. NLRC.[51]
Such ruling has been reversed by the
Court in Alba v. Yupangco,[52]
where the Court ruled:
By Order of September 5, 2007, the Labor
Arbiter denied respondent’s motion to quash the 3rd alias writ. Brushing aside
respondent’s contention that his liability is merely joint, the Labor Arbiter
ruled:
Such issue regarding the personal liability
of the officers of a corporation for the payment of wages and money claims to
its employees, as in the instant case, has long been resolved by the Supreme
Court in a long list of cases [A.C.
Ransom Labor Union-CLU vs. NLRC (142 SCRA 269) and reiterated in the cases
of Chua vs. NLRC (182 SCRA 353), Gudez vs. NLRC (183 SCRA 644)]. In the
aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court has expressly held that the
irresponsible officer of the corporation (e.g. President) is liable for the
corporation’s obligations to its workers. Thus, respondent Yupangco, being the
president of the respondent YL Land and Ultra Motors Corp., is properly jointly
and severally liable with the defendant corporations for the labor claims of
Complainants Alba and De Guzman. x x x
x x x x
As reflected above, the Labor Arbiter held
that respondent’s liability is solidary.
There is solidary liability when the
obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides, or when the nature of
the obligation so requires. MAM Realty
Development Corporation v. NLRC, on solidary liability of corporate
officers in labor disputes, enlightens:
x x x A corporation being a juridical entity,
may act only through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations
incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents are not theirs but the direct
accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True solidary liabilities
may at times be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such
as, generally, in the following cases:
1. When directors and trustees or, in
appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation:
(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence
in directing the corporate affairs;
x x x x
In labor cases, for instance, the Court has
held corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with the corporation
for the termination of employment of employees done with malice or in bad
faith.
A review of the facts of the case
does not reveal ample and satisfactory proof that respondent officers of WWEC
acted in bad faith or with malice in effecting the termination of petitioner
Aliling. Even assuming arguendo that
the actions of WWWEC are ill-conceived and erroneous, respondent officers
cannot be held jointly and solidarily with it. Hence, the ruling on the joint and solidary
liability of individual respondents must be recalled.
Aliling is entitled to Attorney’s Fees and Legal Interest
Petitioner Aliling is also entitled to
attorney’s fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award,
having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of his grievances,
pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code and following our ruling in Exodus
International Construction Corporation v. Biscocho,[53] to wit:
In Rutaquio
v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court held that:
It is settled that in actions for recovery of
wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to
protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legally and
morally justifiable.
In Producers
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that:
Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party
is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason
of an unjustified act of the other party.
While in Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation,[54]
the Court specifically ruled:
However, the award of attorney’s fee is
warranted pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code. Ten (10%) percent of the
total award is usually the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees awarded. It is
settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses
to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legally and
morally justifiable.
x x x."
See -
THIRD DIVISION
ARMANDO ALILING,
Petitioner,
-
versus -
JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL BERSAMIN,
JJ.
F. SAN MATEO III, JOSEPH R.
LARIOSA, and WIDE WIDE Promulgated:
WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
|
G.R. No. 185829
Present:
VELASCO,
JR., J., Chairperson
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ.
Promulgated:
April
25, 2012
|
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