Monday, July 9, 2012

Judge dismissed for partiality and bias.

See  -  http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/RTJ-10-2216.htm


"x x x.



The Issue


          The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City.


The Ruling of the Court


          After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but only in part.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
         
            Section 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.


            In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)



Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.[14]  In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.


          In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt.  As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action, i.e., theEstacio Case.


However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.


A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the court hears fully the merits of the case. Its primary purpose is not to correct a wrong already consummated, or to redress an injury already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to preserve and protect the rights of the litigants during the pendency of the case.[15]  The status quo should be that existing ante litem motam or at the time of the filing of the case.[16]


The CA's Resolution[17] dated July 12, 2006 states in part:

          In order not to render the issues in this case moot and academic, We had in our Resolution of April 24, 2006 granted a Temporary Restraining Order for 60 days from notice directing the respondent Judge to refrain from executing his order of May 30, 2005 and decision of December 12, 2005 declaring petitioner in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a postponement fee of P1,200 and penalty of P20,000. Considering that the TRO is about to expire, for the same reasons provided under Section 3(b) and (c) Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue, to be effective during the pendency of this case, ordering the respondent Judge to refrain from enforcing his disputed issuances of May 30, 2005 and December 12, 2005. The petitioner is exempted from posting the bond, since no private interests are affected in this case.


          As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the CA's disquisition is clear and categorical.  In complete disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the September 6, 2007 Order[18] requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order[19] seeking State Prosecutor Comilang's explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order[20] finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days' imprisonment.


Hence, in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve.


In the case of Pesayco v. Layague,[21] the Court succinctly explained:

            No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge.  A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts.  Such is gross ignorance of the law.  One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence.  Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.

            Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.[22]


This is because judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and  apply  them properly  in  good  faith as judicial competence requires no
less.
[23]   Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt,[24] as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive order issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069, was found guilty of indirect contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 101081.[25]


          Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action.


Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the Court takes note of Judge Belen’s previous administrative cases where he was penalized in the following manner:


Docket No.
Case Title
Charge
Penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
Mane v. Judge Belen[26]
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Reprimand, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall merit a more serious penalty

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176

Baculi v. Judge Belen[27]
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Suspended for 6 months without salary and other benefits, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall merit a more serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242
Correa v. Judge Belen[28]
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Fined for PhP10,000.00 with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall merit a more serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139
Belen v. Judge Belen[29]
Violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Fined for PhP11,000 with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall merit a more serious penalty



          Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law.[30] Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belen’s previous infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court therefore adopts the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.[31]



WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, having been found guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations and government financial institutions. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision. 

 x x x."