Friday, March 9, 2012

"Locus standi" strictly construed - G.R. No. 193978

G.R. No. 193978

"x x x.



B.   
Petitioner lacks locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.  The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”[24]  This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[25] 

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[26]

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant apresent substantial interestas distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."[27]  

To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he “stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.”[28] The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies.[29]  The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection.  Section 9 of EO 7 reads:

            Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. –Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the President. [emphasis ours]

          In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy.   In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies.  To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. 

          
 It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert.  It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of government.  If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication.[30]  The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle.  Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies.[31]

          Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued.  This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,[32] “as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.”[33]  Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case.  The Court made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo[34] and held that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.[35]     

We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot “infuse” or give the petitioner locus standiunder the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine.  In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,[36] we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37]  In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Court’s liberality.  As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,[38] “while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ‘personal injury’ to the broader ‘transcendental importance’ doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.”[39] 

Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth.  In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative. 

x x x."