Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Dishonesty, impropriety, ignorance of the law

In the recent case of GEORGE P. MERCADO, et. al. vs. HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 31, En Banc, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781, October 16, 2009; with companion case: STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO vs. HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 31, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782, October 16, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court found Judge Erasto D. Salcedo guilty of the following administrative offenses:

1. Dishonesty, inefficiency and serious misconduct and violation of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, for which he was fined P40,000.00.

2. Serious misconduct and impropriety in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 2.01of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, for which he was fined of P40,000.00.

3. Gross ignorance of the law under Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for which he was fined of P40,000.00.

In the said case, the Court made the following doctrinal pronouncements, thus:

1. Administrative cases against judges stem from the time-honored constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of the sensitivity of his position, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity; his high and exalted position in the Judiciary requires him to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. As the visible representation of the law and given his task of dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people. He must conduct himself in a manner characterized by propriety and decorum; like Ceasar’s wife, he must be above suspicion. As we held in Padua v. Paz:

Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bear a heavy responsibility in insuring that their conduct is always beyond reproach. The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is of paramount importance. All those occupying offices in the judiciary should at all times be aware that they are accountable to the people. They must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.


2. From all these, what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very superficial investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an investigation at all. Based on this shallow effort, he prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the exoneration of Judge Agayan. These actions tell us that the respondent judge deliberately covered up Judge Agayan’s absences and irregular attendance. The motivation for all these is not hard to discern as it can be read between the lines in the respondent judge’s report, considered in light of the attendant facts. He did all these under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow judge, who was allegedly too sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. In rendering this assistance, the respondent judge also overlooked the absences and irregular attendance of the court staff of Judge Agayan.

3. The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct a thorough and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs. The task assigned to him was an assignment involving trust and the exercise of his functions as a judge. An administrative investigation is an essential component in the judicial machinery for the administrative supervision of courts and court personnel; it is a key process in determining violations of the norms of conduct and standards of service in the judiciary. The respondent judge, therefore, not only failed to do his duty, but violated as well the trust reposed in him as a judge.

4. The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at work is a serious charge that, if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal or suspension from service. Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to the dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in undue delay in the disposition of cases; they also translate to waste of public funds when the absent officials and employees are nevertheless paid despite their absence. As heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates the conduct of court officials and employees and it acts through its subordinates, among them in this case, the respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative supervision is direct by virtue of the delegation made by this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation and by his slanted findings that caused the OCA to recommend the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Agayan and his court personnel, the Court’s administrative machinery failed; the respondent judge’s intent to shield another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity of his report, deprived the Court of the opportunity to act properly on the reported violations of the norms of conduct of judges and court employees.

5. For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned to him, the respondent committed dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which state:

Canon 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 3.08 – A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.


6. We also find that the respondent judge violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that “[a] judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” in relation to Canon 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that a judge’s conduct be above reproach and that he administer justice according to law. This means that a judge, in dispensing justice, “should apply the law impartially, independently, honestly, and in a manner perceived by the public to be impartial, independent and honest.”

7. Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It warrants dismissal from the service when the judicial act is corrupt and inspired by an intention to violate the law, and when it translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error of judgment.

8. In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal feelings rather than to the faithful discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted dishonestly and inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully. This is no less a serious misconduct than a corrupt act undertaken for monetary gains; one as well as the other eroded public confidence in a judge’s ability to render justice.

9. The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a violation of judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court employees – by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions – live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they cannot simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect the performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical questions under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still had cases before his sala.

We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent judge went over the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible borrowing.

10. First, during his cross-examination before the CA, the respondent judge admitted that he knew that the vehicle he borrowed was owned by Leopoldo Gonzaga, who was the accused in the Anti-Fencing case previously before him. The respondent judge could not have avoided this admission given the surrounding circumstances of the case; the vehicle in the Anti-Fencing case was a Pajero, while the vehicle he borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was also a Pajero; while the color of the vehicle had been changed from green to dirty white, it was shown that the vehicle consistently carried the same plate number – “UTN 571”; the respondent judge could not have missed the identity of the vehicle considering his admission that the Pajero was under the court’s custody for several months.

11. Second, the records show that the respondent judge’s initial claim of lack of knowledge is not true. In the preliminary investigation conducted by State Prosecutor Velasco in the Anti-Fencing case involving the Pajero, the respondent judge, when apprehended by policemen, exhibited a court decision he penned in 1999 dismissing the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga for the same vehicle. This incident, which the respondent judge never refuted, clearly indicated that he knew that the vehicle he possessed and used, despite its change of color, was the same vehicle involved in the 1999 Anti-Fencing case that came before him.

12. Thus, the respondent judge not only borrowed a vehicle that was the subject of an Anti-Fencing case before him; he also borrowed it from a lender who had other pending cases before him. In fact, he had to inhibit himself from hearing these cases because of the pendency of the present administrative cases.

13. Under the circumstances, the respondent judge is liable for serious misconduct, given his repeated and deliberate intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of conduct governing his behavior and action as a judge. He committed serious misconduct, first, in using and possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the subject of an anti-fencing case previously before him; and second, he borrowed this vehicle from a litigant who had pending cases before his sala. Both the character of the vehicle borrowed and the identity of the lender precluded him from borrowing and using Leopoldo Gonzaga’s Pajero. While the criminal case filed against the respondent judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was dismissed by the Department of Justice, we agree with Justice Tijam that the respondent judge’s acts at least constitute irresponsible and improper conduct whose effect is to erode public confidence in the judiciary. As aptly stated by Justice Tijam, the respondent judge’s act compromised the image, integrity and uprightness of the courts of law; it cast suspicion not only in his own impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his judicial office, thereby impairing public trust in the exercise of his judicial functions.

14. The evidence adduced in this charge showed that the respondent judge violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in failing to maintain the appearance of integrity and in failing to engage in conduct to promote public confidence in the judiciary. Likewise, he violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics relating to the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the judge’s activities, official or otherwise.

15. The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final and executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal reality, known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law and procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void. To be sure, the respondent judge’s ground for modifying the joint decision is not among these recognized exceptions.

16. For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates professional competence on the part of a judge. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence; otherwise, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

17. The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the respondent judge pending the investigation of these administrative cases are not deterrents to the resolution on the merits of the complaints and to the imposition of the sanctions demanded by the circumstances. Jurisprudence holds that the death of the complainant does not warrant the withdrawal of the charges against the respondent nor does this development render the complaint moot; the complainant is treated only as a witness in this type of proceedings. On the other hand, the death of the respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. The recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the respondent has not been heard and continuation of the proceedings would deny him of his right to due process; second, where exceptional circumstances exist in the case leading to equitable and humanitarian considerations; and third, when the kind of penalty imposed or imposable would render the proceedings useless. None of these exceptional circumstances are present in the case.