Saturday, September 6, 2008

Bail in extradition cases

In the fairly recent case of EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA – BRANCH 17, GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, and DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the right of an extradite to due process of law in the matter of the cancellation of his bail bond.

Citing an earlier case, the Court held that although a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest, the said rule does not apply to the matter of cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk.

The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail.

The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that he is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release. Thus:



x x x.

The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001 by the Government of the United States of America (US government) through the Department of Justice (DOJ) against the petitioners.

X x x.

The issue of prior notice and hearing in extradition cases is not new. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, [11] by a vote of nine to six, we initially ruled that notice and hearing should be afforded the extraditee even when a possible extradition is still being evaluated. [12] The Court, deliberating on a motion for reconsideration also by a vote of nine to six, qualified and declared that prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the process of evaluation. [13]

In the later case of Purganan, eight justices concurred that a possible extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest while six others dissented.

Now, we are confronted with the question of whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before the cancellation of his or her bail.

The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned. He is now in the USA facing the charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing. We agree that her bail should be restored.

In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, [14] because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. [15] On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. [16] If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. [17]

The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to our ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein.

Now, was the order to issue warrant of arrest against petitioners and to cancel the bail of extraditees a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court?

Grave abuse of discretion is capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. [18] In our view, the cancellation of co-petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and hearing, could be considered a violation of co-petitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

Finally, considering that remanding the case to the court a quo will only delay the final resolution of the case as in all probability it would only end up with us again, [19] we will decide if Imelda’s bail was validly cancelled.

In Purganan, we held also that the grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity. [20]

Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Orders dated May 7, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 in Case No. 01-190375 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, as far as petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ is concerned. We hereby (1) declare IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ entitled to bail, (2) order her cancelled bail restored, and (3) order the warrant for her arrest revoked.

SO ORDERED.