Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended) defines LIBEL as a “public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead”.
MALICE and PUBLICITY are indispensable elements of the offense.
In all criminal proceedings, the respondents are entitled to the CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. (Sec. 14 [2], Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution).
The presumption of innocence is a basic and universal human right that forms a crucial part of a person’s right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW and EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (cf. 1947 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
Rule 131, in general, of the Rules of Evidence commands that he who makes an affirmative allegation has the burden of proof to show and establish the veracity thereof.
Sec. 3 of Rule 131 sets forth certain basic legal presumptions, e.g., “that a person is innocent of crime or wrong”, “that official duty has been regularly performed”, and “that the law has been obeyed”.
In the light of the foregoing constitutional and statutory presumptions, the heavy procedural and substantive burden to overcome the same -- and to show with clear, credible, and convincing evidence that the respondents had acted with ACTUAL CRIMINAL MALICE in the discussion, adoption, passage, and release of the subject Barangay Resolution -- lies on the shoulders of the complainants.
Under the EQUIPOISE OF EVIDENCE RULE, all things being equal, that is, where the evidence proffered by the complainants would show neither the guilt nor the innocence of the respondents, the aforesaid constitutional and legal presumptions of innocence should ipso facto operate in favor of the respondents to protect their civil and human rights under the Constitution.
Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, EXCEPT in the following cases of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS:
“1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” (emphasis supplied).
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, inter alia, provides that “in every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted”.
Under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, ACTUAL MALICE, not merely presumptive malice, is required to remove a respondent from the legal protection of the privileged communication rule under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, supra. Article 362 provides: “Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.”
“For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. (Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 [1970]; Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 [1982]; Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]). This is the rule of “actual malice”. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. Public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. (Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357).
As already stated, however, in accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted. (L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 2, 1981 ed., p. 361).
[See also: Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989); - US v. Eguia, 38 Phil. 857 (1918); - People v. Burgos, 59 Phil. 375 (1934); - People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997); - Daez v. CA, 191 SCRA 61 (1990); Art. 353, RPC; Art. 361, RPC; Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995); Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922); US v. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964); Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 (1970); Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 (1982); Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 (1984); Whitney v. California, 247 US 357, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927); Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)].
In the case of OCAMPO vs. SUN-STAR PUBLISHING, INC., G.R. No. 133575, December 15, 2000, the Supreme Court held that while the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to this general rule, set forth in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
In BRILLANTE vs. CA, ET. AL., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATON under Article 354, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the case of OCAMPO, supra, and it clarified that “the interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society”. According to the Supreme Court, “indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for”. (Id.).
The Supreme Court stressed that “the plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members”. (Id.). The said right must be exercised “in good faith” and that such complaints “must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of, that they must be made in good faith, and that they must not be actuated by malice”. (Id.).
In the case of BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G. R. NO. 107566, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the rule on PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION applies to “fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds”.
The Supreme Court further held that “the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, “the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption.” The burden of proving actual malice “shall then rest on the plaintiff”. (Id.).
In BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, supra, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in the prior case of Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 310 SCRA 1, and held that, “even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice”. It further held: “Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.” (Id.).
In the recent case of FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (AMEC-BCCM), GR. 141994, January 17, 2005, which cited the case of BORJAL, supra, , the Supreme held that “fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander”. The doctrine of fair comment means “that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable”.
The Supreme Court further held therein, thus: “In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts”.
